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PERSONAL

Q. Why do you feel that you are qualified to assume the responsibilities of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence?

Q. Do you see any potential conflict of interest in your serving as DDCI and your holding any of your present financial interests?

Q. If requested by this Committee, on the basis of conflict of interest, will you divest yourself of any assets?

PERSONAL

Q. What do you think are your qualifications for the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence?

A. As you may know Senator, the Communist press has claimed that I'd been a CIA agent for years. I wish I could claim that time now as background for the position to which I have been appointed. Those allegations, of course, are not true. I have never been on the payroll of the CIA in any capacity. I have, however, in my various positions in the Foreign Service abroad and most recently as Ambassador to Portugal, had a very close relationship with CIA people in foreign countries. I might say parenthetically that I have always had an extremely high regard for these people and am pleased that I may have a formal and direct association with them if this Committee and the Senate should confirm me. However, as a Foreign Service Officer and as Ambassador and in other policy positions which I have occupied, I have been the recipient of finished intelligence and feel that I have some acquaintance with it and have some knowledge of how finished intelligence can best serve our policymakers, both in the Executive Branch and in the Congress. In my foreign assignments I have had a close relationship to the input of intelligence. Aside from those specific connections, I would hope that my background and experience in the number of executive management and administrative positions which I have held outside of the Foreign Service give me some qualifications as an executive and as an administrator.

PERSONAL

Q. Ambassador, there is some concern that your previous involvement in the foreign policy field and particularly your continuation as a member of the Foreign Service Corps, as you hold the DDCI position, might make you vulnerable to pressure from the policymakers to tamper with, or more delicately, to tilt intelligence judgments and assessments in the direction most favorable to and most desired by policymakers. What assurances can you give this Committee that this will not be the case?

A. Senator I guess that question resolves itself into one of credibility and integrity. People have come into high positions in the Intelligence Community from various walks of life, including the military, political field and elsewhere and have successfully put the influences and positions which they might have had in their previous positions behind them as they entered into these high positions in our Intelligence Community. I am absolutely committed to the proposition that our intelligence product must be above reproach, must be objective regardless of the policy or other implications of the facts as we see them. I am not easily pushed around and I believe my record will show that and I believe that I can take on this job and do it credibly and effectively. I believe this Committee is going to have to pass judgment as the Senate will have to pass judgment on my credibility in this respect.

B. I maintained my foreign service appointment when I previously served as Director/Office of Economic Opportunity, Associate Director/Health Education and Welfare, and at no time did I find it a conflict of interest.

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DDCI ROLE - CIA MISSION

Q. Mr. Ambassador, what is the impact of FOIA upon the CIA and how do you intend to respond?

A. Mr. Chairman, I have no knowledge of the impact of FOIA upon the CIA at this moment. However, I would intend to evaluate the manpower burden and try to achieve as efficient a mechanism as possible for responding to FOIA inquiries.

DDCI ROLE - CIA MISSION

Q. What is your concept of the objective of the CIA?

A. The intent of Congress in creating the Central Intelligence Agency was to establish a focal point in Government whereby intelligence from all producing agencies would be coordinated, correlated, evaluated, and disseminated to the upper echelons of Government for the formulation of national security policies. This centralization would assure that all information vital to the formulation of such policies was provided. Further, under the direction of the President and the National Security Council, the Agency would carry out such other duties as deemed necessary in the national interest.

The objective of the Agency is to meet national security requirements as fully effectively and efficiently as possible utilizing all intelligence assets and resources of Government. The Agency must be unaffected by any considerations which would in any way result in biased and unobjective intelligence reporting.

Calder

DDCI-CIA MISSION

Q. What is the proper role of a secret intelligence organization in an open society?

A. Organizations which must operate in secret contravene the spirit of an open society to a degree, yet it is an inconsistency which nearly all Americans recognize as essential. It is one that is well established in the field of national defense, for example. The remedy to the inconsistency is to insure that intelligence agencies are accountable to the established institutions of Government. The agencies must act strictly within their charters, and cannot operate so as to abridge or in any way infringe on the constitutional rights of Americans.

DDCI ROLE - CIA MISSION

Q. What do you understand to be the extent of your duties and responsibilities as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence?

A. I will be assuming all of the duties and responsibilities of the DDCI granted to me under the provisions of the National Security Act. I will be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the CIA. In the absence of the DCI, I expect to act on his behalf across the board. ~~The two-deputy system - one for the CIA and one for the Community - will be abandoned.~~ Both Admiral Turner and I believe that a deputy can only function effectively as an alter ego if he has across-the-board responsibilities. This means that when Admiral Turner is away, I will assume his Community-wide responsibilities as well as his CIA responsibilities.

DDCI ROLE - CIA MISSION

How do you define the Director's authority over operations of the DIA and other components of the Intelligence Community?

Mr. Chairman, the Director's budgetary ^{resources} ~~resources~~ control over all components of the Intelligence Community ~~should~~ be strengthened. So should his authority to task those components. Day to day line control over Community entities other than the CIA however ~~should~~ remain with the heads of those agencies and departments. *well*

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OVERSIGHT

Q. How do you feel about the question of congressional oversight committees having access to reports made to the Intelligence Oversight Board?

A. This should be a matter for the Intelligence Oversight Board and White House to decide. It is my understanding that at present it is not ~~White House~~ policy to have reports made to the IOB by members of the intelligence community automatically sent to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Surely, however, any ~~significant~~ illegal or improper act or mission committed by a component of CIA should be made known to the oversight committee.

President

OVERSIGHT

Q. Do you believe the GAO should conduct an external audit function?

A. Yes, assuming a formula can be found in which sources and methods are protected. This process could take place as part of the ~~Senate~~ oversight process.

Committee

OVERSIGHT

Q. What do you perceive to be your responsibilities to the Congress as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence if you are confirmed for that position?

A. It will be my policy to be as responsive as possible to the Congress.

I will respond to the best of my ability within whatever oversight framework the Congress considers suitable and, as I said in my opening statement, will cooperate with this Committee in exercising its oversight responsibilities to ensure that the Executive Order is complied with. I shall seek to develop a good working relationship between the Congress and both the CIA and the Intelligence Community.

I will also make every effort to meet congressional needs for substantive information, consistent with my responsibilities to the DCI, to the President and to the National Security Council for the provision of intelligence inputs on policy problems currently under consideration.

OVERSIGHT

Q. What is your view of the degree to which Congress should oversee intelligence activities?

A. Congress has far-reaching legislative oversight and appropriations responsibilities under the Constitution. Obviously, appropriate committees of Congress must have knowledge of intelligence activities so that they can exercise these fundamental responsibilities. I fully recognize this, and I am committed to working with Congress in this regard.

I think the American people want strong and effective congressional oversight that imposes clear accountability on intelligence organizations, while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort.

Because of the sensitivity of much of the information involved, I would hope that the Congress can see its way clear to concentrate its oversight activities to the extent feasible and eliminate any requirements that I provide the same sensitive information to a sizeable number of different committees.

OVERSIGHT

Q. What is your attitude on providing reports of the Inspector General to Congressional oversight committees?

A. My own feeling is that CIA must be able to hold within itself certain confidential aspects of management. If the system of inspection is to work, candid, privileged communications from the Inspector General to the Director and Deputy Director must be maintained. Inspectors, I hope, engage in candid discussions with the employees of the organizational components of the Agency under inspection, and report equally as candid and confidential to the Director and his Deputy as to their findings and recommendations. These reports are not distributed within the Agency, being intended only to provide the basis for possible corrective action by top management. Were it to become known that the confidentiality of these reports could no longer be guaranteed, it could well be found that sources would dry up or people being interviewed would cease to be as candid in their responses. It has been my experience in the Foreign Service that Department of State Inspector General reports enjoy confidentiality and protection. This should, in my opinion, apply also to the CIA.

PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE

Q. What policy will you follow in providing information to the Congress and in keeping the Congress informed?

A. I clearly recognize that the Congress must be adequately informed in order to make proper and informed judgments in matters of legislation and oversight. Committees must acquire required information within their jurisdiction to carry out these responsibilities. Information provided by the Executive to the Congress which requires protection under statute or Executive order must, however, be handled accordingly by the Congress. Further, the Congress exercises its prerogative of nondisclosure through executive sessions and other closed meetings. Similarly, the Executive must exercise its prerogatives of nondisclosure in matters of executive privilege and clear statutory mandates.

I trust that an atmosphere of comity and understanding will allow a mutual resolution of this problem and avoid confrontations. The national interest must always be the paramount consideration.

PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE

Q. What kind of substantive intelligence support do you believe the CIA should provide Congress?

A. I believe that a truly American system of intelligence must include arrangements for providing intelligence information to Congress. The people's elected representatives deserve the best possible information on which to base legislative action, and to the extent that CIA intelligence is applicable and helpful, I feel that it is important to provide it. In fact, there is already an extensive program for providing intelligence support to the House and Senate. As you know, the DCI and other top Agency officials appear before various committees regularly and on request to assess political and military developments of significance. In addition, CIA analysts provided 289 oral briefings during 1977 to committees, Senators and Congressmen, and staff members. CIA had a total of 727 requests for finished intelligence publications (memoranda, reports, biographic reports). The number of actual publications provided would be a good deal higher, since most requests were for more than one document. It should be noted that this number does not include publications provided to your committee (SSCI), which for 1977 numbered 558. Nor does it include publications provided to committees on a regular basis. The most important of these is the National Intelligence Daily, CIA's current intelligence publication, which now goes every day to eight committees. In addition, CIA filled 286 requests for unclassified information, statistical charts, maps, etc., during 1977. As you can see, the substantive support provided to the Congress is considerable, and I will expand the present program wherever possible.

PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE

Q. Has the substantive intelligence support provided to Congress increased over the last few years?

A. Yes, indeed. In the case of oral briefings, for example, CIA provided 188 in 1975, 244 in 1976, and, as I have already mentioned, 289 in 1977. In the case of written material, CIA had 204 requests in 1975, 446 in 1976, and, as I said earlier, 727 in 1977.

PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE

Q. Do you see an increasing danger that CIA's analysis might be tailored to fit the Administration's policy?

A. This is a fundamental problem, and one which CIA officials must constantly keep in mind. The Agency has a long tradition of independent, impartial analysis. I think it has been true over the years that the CIA has called the shots pretty much as it has seen them. This is not to say that Agency analysis has never been wrong; it certainly has been, and on more than one occasion. What I do want to say is that CIA analysts have by and large not been swayed by whatever policies an administration happened to be advocating at a particular moment. It is supremely important that the Agency maintain its reputation for independent analysis in the future. CIA has no business making policy; its proper role is to provide accurate, unbiased information and analysis for policymakers to use as they see fit. I intend to uphold the Agency's position in this regard.

PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE

Q. During the past several months it has appeared to some that the Agency has come dangerously close to trying to influence events by releasing unclassified publications on matters of considerable importance--"Prospects for Soviet Oil Production," "International Energy Situation to 1985," "World Steel Market: Continued Trouble Ahead." Do you see dangers in releasing studies like these to the public?

A. I believe it to be very important for the Agency to share as much of its analysis with the public as is possible. Much of what CIA's analytical shops do is based in some part on open sources, and so there is often no security problem in releasing it. In addition, many of these studies can make a very real contribution since there is nothing available in the private sector that is comparable. CIA's Soviet oil study is a good example of this; so is the dollar cost comparison of U.S. and Soviet defense expenditures, which was just released in January. Another good argument for releasing as much as possible to the people is that they pay for all of this work with their tax dollars. But you are quite right to suggest that there is a danger there. If CIA releases a study, say, on oil production, there is bound to be suspicion in some quarters that the Agency is in cahoots with the oil companies. The way to allay such suspicions, I think, is to continue the program of public release, which as you know is quite new. Over time, it will be seen that the CIA is not preaching any particular point of view or attempting to push events in any particular direction, but is trying to contribute to the public debate as accurately as it can.

PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE

Q. Do you think the SSCI has a role to play in(improving)CIA analysis?

A. I do, indeed. I understand that your Subcommittee on the Quality of Intelligence is off to a good start. I have read with interest your study of CIA reporting on oil developments, which was released publicly not long ago, although I am told that the CIA didn't agree with much of what you wrote. It seems to me that this episode shows what you and the Agency should perhaps be striving for: the development of a constructive dialogue. I am not at all bothered that the Agency and the SSCI do not see eye to eye on a particular segment of CIA reporting. Honest differences of opinion exist all the time. It seems to me that if questions are raised and differences discussed, there is a good chance that the result will be better CIA analysis in the future.

Sen. Case

PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE

Q. What do you think should be done to improve the quality of CIA analysis?

A. I understand that a number of steps have already been taken in conjunction with the establishment of the National Foreign Assessment Center under Robert Bowie. There are several things that seem to me to be important in maintaining and improving the quality of the CIA analytical product:

- Steps must be taken to insure that intelligence information is reaching the analysts it should reach in the Intelligence Community. I have in mind here the Pearl Harbor problem-- the problem of information being available but not getting to the right place and consequently being of no use at all.
- The Agency must maintain its ability to provide day-to-day, and sometimes, hour-by-hour, reporting on fast-moving political and military situations (in other words, its current intelligence function). It must also engage in longer-term research. I don't mean ivory-tower research-- CIA is not the place for that--but rather studies of the most important policy-related problems of the day. Both current analysis and longer-term research must be done; one should not be emphasized at the expense of the other.
- Contacts between Agency analysts and experts in the outside world--which I understand have increased recently--should be encouraged in the future.
- Agency managers should ensure that quality analysis is rewarded, so that the CIA can keep the good analysts it has and hire more high-quality people in the future.

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REORGANIZATION

Q. What are your views on reorganizing the Intelligence Community?

A. Admiral Turner has already effected some organizational changes in the Intelligence Community structure in establishing a National Intelligence Tasking Center, a new structure for intelligence assessments, and a Deputy Director for Resources. This centralizing of functional responsibilities allows overall and direct supervision of community assets by the Director as intelligence chief. The Administration under the new Executive Order is establishing further changes. We will work closely with the Congress in charter legislation decisions and we may "fine tune" existing structures. I propose to work very closely with Admiral Turner in making sure that the organizational structure of CIA and the Intelligence Community meets our needs in the most effective way possible.

REORGANIZATION

Q. What are your views on the priority of technical means of collecting intelligence over human collection of intelligence?

A. I do not see a general priority issue. The policymakers and the Congress need the very best intelligence available. In some circumstances these needs can be supplied by only one method of collection, but I have found that a majority of types of questions facing our policy-makers require intelligence from several sources, mutually supporting one another by providing their own unique capabilities.

REORGANIZATION

Q. What do you understand will be your responsibilities as concerns the Intelligence Community?

A. In addition to the day to day operation of CIA, under the direction of Admiral Turner, I will have Intelligence Community responsibilities as well, to include the National Foreign Assessment Center and the National Intelligence Tasking Center. In the absence of the Director, I will act in the exercise of all of his powers as required by statute.

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OPEN BUDGET

Q. Why is the Executive Branch leaving its decision up to Congress? If no one has any objection to releasing a figure, why don't you do it unilaterally?

A. The full Senate in 1974 and the full House in 1975 overwhelmingly voted against release. In deference to the Congress, I believe the Congress should participate in this decision, just as they must share the responsibility to insure that no further disclosures are made.

OPEN BUDGET

Q. Last year Admiral Turner testified before this Committee on the subject of an open budget. He testified that this Administration would not oppose Congress releasing a single budget figure encompassing all foreign intelligence programs. Do you support this position?

A. This has been a controversial issue since 1974 when Senator Proxmire first raised it. Since that time, there have been full Senate and House votes against disclosure and a vote of the Church Committee and this Committee narrowly in favor of it. In the same period of time, the Executive Branch has changed from opposing release, to not objecting. I support the present Administration's position of not opposing the release of a single figure, as long as we can be certain that the disclosure would not go beyond the one figure. As in so many issues of secrecy versus disclosure, there are trade offs. Unquestionably, the release of even one figure gives our adversaries significant insight into size and scope of the intelligence programs directed against them. If this is compounded by disclosure of one figure over a number of years, I believe trends can be discerned which will aid them further. On the other side, there has been a marked trend toward more openness regarding intelligence activities and information in recent years, which I believe has contributed to a greater understanding by the American people of what intelligence is attempting to accomplish. The release of a single figure would carry this trend one step further without, I believe, significantly endangering any U.S. Government intelligence capabilities. Therefore, I would not oppose release of a single figure.

COVERT ACTION

Q. How do you view the role of CIA in covert action?

A. I believe CIA must maintain a covert action capability to be used judiciously and after all appropriate authority has been received.

During my career, I have served at certain posts or in certain positions from where I could observe the activities overseas of CIA. I have been generally impressed with the caliber, responsibility and professionalism of the CIA officers whom I have known, and with the job they are doing. I believe they can continue to play a role in covert action in those select instances when the President finds it in the national interest. The notification of Congress of each such activity and the continuing congressional oversight process should insure the responsibility of this activity.

COVERT ACTION

Q. If confirmed as DDCI, will you inform this Committee in advance of covert actions to be undertaken by the Agency?

A. Since reporting of covert action is regulated by law requiring the involvement of the President, I certainly cannot make any commitments to act on my own in this area. I understand the new Executive Order on reorganization will require prior notification to this Committee and your counterpart, the House Select Committee on Intelligence. I will, of course, act in accordance with the law under the provisions of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment and in accordance with the Executive Order.

COVERT ACTION

Q. Mr. Ambassador, the President of the U.S. has endorsed the philosophy of international human rights. How do you rationalize the use of covert action by the CIA and the President's posture on human rights?

A. The use of covert action by the CIA is reserved for those few situations where diplomacy or military action are unacceptable alternatives. All covert action efforts must, of course, be approved by the President and prompt notification made to the Congress under existing law. I would expect the President to weigh the issues of human rights in every decision that he makes in international affairs.

Rights of Citizens

Q. Are you aware of the bills to regulate electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes which are before the Congress and what is your opinion of them?

A. I have not yet had the opportunity to study the proposals in detail, but fully intend to do so once I am confirmed. I do believe, however, that the warrant procedure proposed by the Administration in S. 1566 and H.R. 7308 strikes the correct balance between protection of the rights of Americans and this country's need for foreign intelligence information.

(For background: the Administration bills cover electronic surveillance within the United States. The Central Intelligence Agency does not engage in activities which would be regulated by the bills, but it may at times provide technical assistance to agencies performing the surveillance. In addition, the bills do provide that the DCI will play a role in establishing the security procedures which the courts will follow in safeguarding records and that the President may designate the DCI and the DDCI as officers who can make the certifications required as a part of a warrant applicati



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SECURITY

Q. Do you feel CIA overclassified information? If so, what can be done to assure that information is properly classified?

A. The issue has been a proper balance to assure that the public is informed and that national security is not endangered. As DDCI, I will carefully review Intelligence Community programs to identify those activities which require continued protection and those areas where a broader disclosure will not be harmful. I understand that with the issuance of Executive Order 11652 regarding classification and declassification, the Agency has been able to reduce by 50 percent the number of materials classified. I will periodically assess classification procedures and strive toward the maximum dissemination possible consistent with national security.

SECURITY

Q. Are CIA personnel overseas adequately protected? If not, what can be done by the Executive Branch to improve this situation? Do you support bills which have been introduced to provide criminal penalties for disclosure of information leading to the identification of CIA employees under cover?

A. I think it is important that the country protect the dedicated men and women it sends overseas to engage in foreign intelligence activities. If these people are to be effective, they usually must not be openly identified as intelligence personnel. I think there is much that both the Congress and the Executive Branch can do to improve the "cover" arrangements made for these people. For example, Congress might consider providing explicit statutory authority for the Director to make adequate "cover" arrangements.

The exposure of individuals involved in the foreign intelligence operations of the United States can seriously jeopardize their personal safety and the safety of their families and associates. Although the nation has already witnessed tragedy in this respect, groups and individuals within the United States, whose avowed purpose is to destroy the nation's foreign intelligence capability, are still attempting to discover and publish the identities of intelligence personnel. In my view, existing law is almost completely inadequate in deterring this kind of malicious act. I strongly support legislation that will strengthen existing law in this respect.

SECURITY

Q. Should Government classification of information be governed by statute or Executive Order? Why?

A. The essential point is that whatever classification system is adopted must afford sufficient protection for sensitive information. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence is made responsible for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The continued success of our foreign collection programs rests on this protection. Executive orders and court decisions concerning secrecy have recognized this statutory responsibility and have granted the Agency a degree of latitude and flexibility to mold its security programs to assure the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Any statutory classification program must grant an equal degree of protection, and must be administratively workable.

SECURITY

Q. Mr. Ambassador, do you intend to prosecute Frank Snepp?

A. I understand that this entire matter is presently under review by the Justice Department and I would not want to make any comment which would in any way prejudice their action. I fully support a stringent security program to assure the protection of sensitive intelligence information, and as I said in my opening statement regarding the case of an expose' of CIA personnel by a former CIA employee, "...I would appreciate an opportunity to have a dialogue with this Committee on ways to deal with this type of cold-blooded irresponsibility while still protecting the basic rights of American citizens."

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INTERNAL OVERSIGHT OF CIA

Q. How do you propose to make sure that the CIA is and remains in compliance with law and operates in a manner consistent with American standards of propriety?

A. I was interested in Chairman Inouye's words when he stated recently:

"There is no question that a number of abuses of power, mistakes in judgement and failures by the intelligence agencies have harmed the U.S. We, of course, hope that these abuses are behind us and will not occur again. These events did not happen in a vacuum. In almost every instance, the abuses that have been revealed were a result of direction from above, including Presidents and Secretaries of State."

This being the case, I feel confident that in this administration there is no danger of "direction from above" of improper activities.

I associate myself with Admiral Turner's resolve that CIA will remain within the bounds of law and propriety as he has expressed it to you on various occasions in the past. I also am told that there is a strong expanded CIA inspection system and office of legal counsel. Not of least importance is the Intelligence Oversight Board and the congressional oversight which surely serves as a useful control. In these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine willful or successful flaunting of law or propriety by any component of CIA.

INTERNAL OVERSIGHT OF CIA

Q. How can you be sure you know what is going on inside CIA so you may make determinations as to the propriety or legality of such acts?

A. I would devote myself to making sure the line command has adequately indoctrinated supervisors and employees as to what is right or wrong or when to seek advice from the General Counsel if the issue is not clear. The awareness, discipline and ethics of all employees are at the heart of mission propriety. The inspection and audit systems should, however, provide a necessary and valuable double check and deterrent.

INTERNAL OVERSIGHT OF CIA

Q. How can we be sure there will be no more historical surprises such as MKULTRA unearthed?

A. I would not wish to make any guarantees on this score, at least until I have had a better chance to examine the file, storage and retrieval system of CIA. I would think that files dating back 30 years could always contain surprises, but I would hope and assume that by now all is being done which can be done to uncover old business which should be made known to this Committee or to the public. I am told that the retrieval of old material, which predates modern retrieval systems, now has a large task force manually reviewing all old archives.

Media Relations

Q. Do you support Admiral Turner's new policy of openness toward the public?

A. I do. Only a well-informed public will actively support the activities of its government. Intelligence cannot be aloof from the public which it serves. Aloofness and secrecy are two entirely different things and I believe with Admiral Turner that the American public has a right to know as much as possible about what we do, how we do it and why.

Media Relations

Q. Unless foreign journalists and foreign media are included the Agency's policy on relations with the media, there remains the danger that information or disinformation placed abroad by the CIA will find its way back to this country. What can and should be done to prevent this?

A. I view that danger as no greater than the danger of material placed by others, such as the KGB, finding its way into our media. In either case, the soundest safeguard is the alertness and integrity of U.S. media representatives gathering the news abroad. I cannot imagine a responsible U.S. journalist picking up material abroad without checking its validity.

In this connection, I should say that in almost all cases when the CIA places material in the foreign media it does so to provide a balance of truth to audiences which otherwise would get only propaganda or tailored news.

We should all remember that most people in the world do not have the benefit of a free press. I quote from a report made by Freedom House before last year's annual meeting of the Inter-American Press Association: "The ultimate test of the free-flow idea is whether the journalist himself can enter and leave a country at will, have direct access to the sources of news, report what he learns without advance or later censorship, fear reprisals neither against himself or his news service, and then transmit a clear and balanced report. Fewer than one-third of the countries permit such press freedom."

Media Relations

Q. The new policy issued by Admiral Turner regarding CIA relations with the media does not extend to journalists working for foreign media organizations. Do you feel this limitation is appropriate?

A. I do. The policy was adopted in recognition of the status afforded the U.S. media under our constitution. In denying ourselves sources of intelligence, we should draw the line at that point.

Any other line would be difficult, if not impossible, to define. I feel, for instance, that we should not turn away a journalist from a hostile foreign power who agrees to cooperate with us. But a blanket policy prohibiting the use of foreign journalists would prohibit our taking advantage of just that kind of situation.

Media Relations

Q. There have been many leaks of classified information. Would you want to curtail the media's right to publish such information?

A. Certainly not. The rights of the media in this connection are unarguable.

But I would like to see more soul-searching and self-restraint on the part of the media. Only too often does one see the media reporting almost gleefully that the information in a certain story comes from top secret government documents. This is of great concern to me. It implies that the media are in a better position than the nation's intelligence agencies to decide what should or should not be secret.

Media Relations

Q. Under what conditions would you, as acting DCI, make use of the exception that is built into the CIA's policy on relations with the media?

A. I would avail myself of the exception when the information concerned is vital. Obviously someone has to make the decision on what is vital. I view this as a most serious responsibility, and I am willing to shoulder it.

Hypothetical case: A Middle East stringer for a U.S. newspaper approaches our Chief of Station in his country's capital and says his cousin, who belongs to a terrorist cell has information that the terrorists plan to kill the American ambassador or to blow up an airliner. The cousin is prepared to provide this information for payment or promise of asylum. I feel we should not turn away such an offer.

Hypothetical case: A stringer for a U.S. wire service has access to a highly classified nuclear installation in his own country. He approaches our station and volunteers information based on his observations. He offers to cooperate on a purely voluntary basis to obtain additional information. I feel we should not have to reject such an offer.

Media Relations

Q. One potential danger in the CIA's new openness is that information can be placed in the public sector selectively, that is, it can be published or withheld as classified in an effort to support a foreign policy aim or in furtherance of some other goal. What would you do to prevent such an action?

A. The CIA is and should be a collector and analyzer of information useful and indeed essential to those who formulate policy. If some of that information can be made available to the public, it should be. The public has paid for it. But I would consider the use of such information for any other purpose improper, and I would not tolerate it.

Media Relations

Q. How can you reconcile the Agency's avowed policy of openness with the necessary constraints of secrecy?

A. These concepts are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, I believe that openness to the extent possible engenders public understanding of that which cannot be open.

We must work hard at overcoming the Watergate syndrome of public cynicism and distrust in government. Elected officials and their appointees are in office because the public has placed a trust in them. They should be given a chance to do their jobs and to provide that the trust be well placed.

But by the same token, I would find it abhorrent to use the stamp of secrecy to hide an embarrassment. In the final analysis, what stands between proper secrecy and the abuse of secrecy is the conscience and integrity of people. A society that cannot have a measure of faith in these things and in a system of oversight cannot have effective government at all.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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**MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEDIA: New CIA Regulations on Relationships
with U.S. News Media**

New CIA regulations on relationships with U.S. news media organizations have been approved by Admiral Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence.

The Central Intelligence Agency previously issued a public statement regarding its policy on relationships with representatives of the U.S. news media on 11 February 1976. That statement said:

"Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station. As soon as feasible, the Agency will bring existing relationships with individuals in these groups into conformity with this new policy."

All existing relationships covered by that policy statement had been severed by the end of 1976.

A number of additional and relevant points have been raised and addressed since issuance of that statement.

Admiral Turner consolidated these and incorporated them into new regulations which he signed on 30 November 1977. A copy of the new regulations is attached.

Attachment

NEW REGULATIONS APPROVED ON CIA RELATIONS WITH U.S. NEWS MEDIA

The Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner, ordered implementation of the following regulations on 30 November 1977:

1. Policy. The special status afforded the press under the Constitution necessitates a careful policy of self-restraint on the part of the Agency in regard to its relations with U.S. news media organizations and personnel. Accordingly, CIA will not:

a. enter into any relationships with full-time or part-time journalists (including so-called "stringers") accredited by a U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio, or television network or station, for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities. The term "accredited" means any full- or part-time employee of U.S. or foreign nationality who is formally authorized by contract or by the issuance of press credentials to represent himself or herself either in the U.S. or abroad as a correspondent for a U.S. news media organization or who is officially recognized by a foreign government to represent a U.S. news media organization;

b. without the specific, express approval of senior management of the organization concerned, enter into any relationships with non-journalist staff employees of any U.S. news media organization for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities;

c. use the name or facilities of any U.S. news media organization to provide cover for any Agency employees or activities.

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2. Limitations

a. The policies set forth above are not designed to inhibit open relationships with journalists (as for example contracts to perform translating services or to lecture at Agency training courses) which are entered into for reasons unrelated to such persons' affiliation with a particular news media organization. Willingness on both sides to acknowledge the fact and nature of the relationship is the essential characteristic of the open relationships into which CIA will enter with journalists under this provision.

b. In addition, CIA will not deny any person including full-time or part-time accredited journalists and stringers regardless of profession, the opportunity to furnish information which may be useful to his or her Government. Therefore, CIA will continue to permit unpaid relationships with journalists or other members of U.S. news media organizations who voluntarily maintain contact for the purpose of providing information on matters of foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence interest to the U.S. Government.

c. Likewise, the Agency, through the Office of the Assistant for Public Affairs to the Director, will continue to maintain regular liaison with representatives of the news media to provide public information, answers to inquiries, and assistance in obtaining unclassified briefings on substantive matters.

3. Exceptions. No exceptions to the policies and prohibitions stated above may be made except with the specific approval of the DCI.

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